University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

1-31-1941

AMES et al. v. EMPIRE STAR MINES CO., Ltd., et
al.
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, AMES et al. v. EMPIRE STAR MINES CO., Ltd., et al. 17 Cal.2d 213 (1941).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/13

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

212

OLIVE PRORA'flON E'fC. COM.

v. Amu.

E'l'C. COM. [17 C.(2d)

States, and California growers do not need the benefit of proration in order to receive maximum returns for their crops.
But the only issue which the commission could decide in the
proceeding before it was the sufficiency of the petition. If
the petition was signed by the requisite number of producers
and owners of producing factors, it was the duty of the commission, under the law. as then in force, to terminate the
program regardless of other facts. The evidence sought to
be introduced by respondents Hughes and Isely would not be
relevant to that issue even if it might be received at this late
date.
[9] As another ground justifying its action, the commission asserts that its last order should be upheld because the
evidence upon which it is based, although received after the
conclusion of the hearing, may be reviewed in the judicial
proceeding authorized by the act. To approve such a practice would mean that an administrative body could base a
finding and order 'on information or reports secretly received
without the knowledge of the parties, and successfully defend
that action by answering that the remedy of the one aggrieved
by the decision is to challenge the data or evidence in a later
judicial proceeding. That is not the procedure provided for
by the statute.
.::t
The motion to take additional evidence is denied. Let a
writ of mandate issue requiring the respondent commission to
annul its orders of July 26 and August 7, 1939.
Traynor, J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Peters, J., pro tem.,
and Ward, J., pro tem., concurred.
Gibson, C. J., deeming himself disqualified, does not participate in this decision.
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WORTHINGTON AMES et al., Appellants, v. EMPIRE
STAR MINES COMPANY, LTD., et al., Respondents.
[1] Mines and Minerals-Estate and Rights of Locator-Subsur-

face Rights-Extralateral Rights.-Congress intended by the
Mining Act of July 26, 1866 (14 U. S. Stat. at Largs,
251) to recognize and give legal validity to all existing mining claims in accordance with local rule, custom and regulation, including extralateral rights in those lands to which
such rules and regulations applied.
[2] Id. - Estate and Rights of Locator - Subsurface Rights _
Extralateral Rights-Limitations.-Under the Mining Act of
July 26, 1866, a patentee acquired the legal title to extralateral
rights, provided they had not previously been conveyed away
by the government, for such acts could not divest private
owners of existing vested rights.
[3] Public Lands-Disposal of Pederal Public Domain-Grants to
Railroads-Lands Included-Mineral Land.-By the Railroad
Grant Act of July 25, 1866, Congress did not intend to vest
in a railroad the title to any mineral lands of the United
States. And the railroad grant did not pass title to the subsurface of land which was clearly mineral, and known to be
such at the time the patent was issued, where there was no
final and definite location of land by the railroad until the
securing of a patent, and where at that time extralateral rights
of adjoining mines had vested. And this is true despite the
fact that this act was passed one day earlier than the Mining Act of July 26, 1866.
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[4] Mines and Minerals-Land Subject to Mineral Location-Rail_
road Grant-Time When Mineral Right Obtainable.-Mineral
lands being excepted from the grant to railroads under the
Railroad Grant Act of July 25, 1866, title thereto can be acquired as against the railroad subsequent to the enactment of
such act and at any time up to the date of the patent.
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See 22 R. C. L. 291.
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McK. Dig. References: 1. Mines and Minera!:;, § 47; 2, 5, 9.
Mines and Minerals, § 47 (2); 3. Public Lands, § 144 (4); 4. Mines
and Mlnerals, § 7; 6. Public Lands, § 183; 7. Property, § 5; 8. Public Lands, § 14 (3); 10. Mines and Minerals, § 119; 11. Mines and
Minerals, § 74; 12, 13. Mines and Minerals, § 57; 14. Evidence,
§ 271; 15, 16, 17. Mines and Minerals, § 138 (2).
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[5] Id.-Estate and Rights of Locator-Subsurface Rights-Ex:tralateral Rights-Patent to Agricultural Land.-An agricultural patent issued merely on the basis of an ex parte hearing
on the part of the claimant to the land can in no way abrogate the existing vested extralateral rights of parties who had
nothing to do with the proceeding.
[6] Public Lands-Disposal of Federal Domain-Patents-Operation and Effect.-The government cannot convey away land
which is no longer owned, and a patent cannot cut off previously existing vested rights in the patented property.
ub
[7] Property-Title, Ownership and possession-In General-S surface.-The title to the surface may be in one person and
the title to the subsurface in another.
[8] Public Lands-School and University Lands-In GeneralLands Included-Mineral Lands-Effect of Certification by
Register. _ Under 14 U. S. Stat. at Large, 251, granting
school lands but excepting mineral lands, the state does
not acquire a fee simple to the subsurface of land where
at the time of the survey extraterritorial rights of adjoining
mining claims had vested. A certification by the register of
the United States Land Office that there was no claim or filing
on certain lands other than that of the state is not effective as
against existing vested extralateral rights therein.
[9] Mines and Minerals-Estate and Rights of Locator-Subsurface Rights-Extralateral Rights-Length of Claim-Application of Statute.-The Mining Act of 1872 (see 30 U. S. C. A.,
sec. 23), restricting future mining claims asserting extralateral
rights to a maximum of 1500 feet along a vein, does not apply
to a patent secured at a later date, when issued in pursuance
of the Mining Act of July 26, 1866, on the basis of an earlier

:!

location.
[10] Id.._patents_Conclusiveness-Collateral Attack.-Where a
patented mining claim exceeds 1500 feet as the result of the
consolidation of several original claIms, the lines thereof need
not be shown to establish the validity of the patent on collateral attack.
[11] Id.-Transfers and Conveyances-Deeds-Estoppel.-Where
.
the grantee of land takes under a deed containing a reservation to the grantor and his assigns of the right to follow a
vein of ore beneath the surface and to mine therefrom, a successor in interest of the grantor can successfully assert such
reserved right although the mine was never patented, and
although it had been abandoned and relocated after the issuance of a patent to such granted land.
[12] Id.. _ Abandonment, Forfeiture and Annual Work-Annual
Work _ Effect of Nonperformance.-The title to a mining
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claim does not terminate on the failure to perform annual
labor. The intervention of a third party and a relocation of
the ground must occur before any forfeiture can take place.
[13] Id.-Abandonment, Forfeiture and Annual Work-Annual
Work-Effect of Nonperformance - Who may Urge.-The
grantee under a deed reserving to the grantor and his assigns
the right to follow and mine from a vein cannot, by reason
of such reservation, take advantage of any forfeiture and subsequent relocation of the mining claim to which such reserved
right is appurtenant.
[14] Evidence - Hearsay - Exceptions to Rule-Character and
Reputation-Boundaries.-The rule that evidence of common
reputation existing previous to the controversy may be introduced to prove the existence of boundaries and facts of a
public or general interest more than thirty years old applies
to the original location of a mine, particularly on government
land. (See Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1870.)
[15] Mines and Minerals-Actions and Proceedings-General Considerations - Admissibility of Evidence - Documentary Evidence.-In proof of the proper location and existence of mining claims, a party may introduce patent records containing
abstracts of title to the mining claim, recitals as to location
of the claims in ancient deeds, verified statements as to the
location and possession of the mine, a copy of the articles of
incorporation of the early mining corporation, a certified copy
of the minutes of meetings of the Quartz Miriers of the
Valley, descriptions of the claims by metes and bounds, the
registrar's final certificate of entry of the fact, and the field
notes of survey and report of the United States Deputy Mineral Surveyor on the mine.
.
[16] ld.-Actions and Proceedings-General Considerations-Admissibility of Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Official Reports.-The official report of the Mineral Resources of the
Public Domain of the West which was published under the
direct authority of Congress, being an official report to the
secretary of the treasury, is admissible to show the location
and working of mines in pursuance to the miners' rules and
regulations then in existence.
[17] ld.-Actions and Proceedings-General Considerations-Admissibility of Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Histories.The History of Yuba County by Chamberlain and Wells
(1879) is admissible under Code of Civil Procedure, section
1936, to prove the location of a mining claim, inasmuch as
evidence of general reputation is competent for such purpose.
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by the definite location of the railroad line. The patent
stated that the Ames Tract was agricultural land, and plaintiffs contend that this patent c.onclusively determined the
character of the land as non-mineral, and related the title
back to the date of the Railroad Grant Act of July 25, 1866.
A patent to the Pennsylvania claim was secured by the defendants' predecessors in interest .on August 18, 1880, pursuant to the Mining Act .of JUly 26, 1866. In 1872, Congress
passed another act relating t.o mines which provided that a
mining claim, to secure extralateral rights, could equal but
n.ot exceed 1500 feet along the vein or lode. Plaintiffs assert
that since the defendants' patent was secured subsequent
t.o the passage .of this act, it is subject to the provisi.ons
thereof, and therefore that the owners of the Pennsylvania
claim, which is 1540 feet along the vein or l.ode, are precluded
from claiming any extralateral rights. No patent was ever
secured to the Jefferson claim, which was apparently located
at the same time as the Pennsylvania claim, abandoned, and
subsequently relocated. The defendants show that they now
in effect have full title to it. They also present in evidence
the deed of the Ames Tract to the plaintiffs from one Ebert,
the immediate predecess.or in title, which contains a reservation by him, as grantor, of the right to follow the Jefferson vein beneath the surface of the Ames Tract and to mine
therefrom. This right was subsequently c.onveyed by Ebert
to the defendants.
Between the Ames Tract and the Pennsylvania and Jefferson mines there is a narr.ow strip of school land granted
to the State of Calif.ornia under the Act .of Congress of
March 3, 1853 (10 Stats. at Large 244), and this grant
also excepted mineral lands from its terms. Subsequent to
its final survey in 1867, part of this land ,was conveyed
to the defendants, the residue remaining in the hands of the
state as school land. Plaintiffs contend that the state acquired a fee simple in this land, including the subsurface,
s.o that defendants could have no extralateral rights therein
and were thus effectively cut off from the Ames Tract.
Defendants have presented evidence in the form of testimony of old settlers, abstracts of title, patent records, deeds,
and government reports and surveys to pr.ove the original
location of both the Pennsylvania and Jefferson claims in
accordance with the miners' rules and regulations pri.or to
1863 j the working of these claims, including tbl.il subsurface

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yuba
County. Warren Steel, Judge. Affirmed.
Simeon E. Sheffey and Richard Belcher for Appellants.
Robert M. Searls, Jones & l!'innegan and William E. Colby,
for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-This controversy is between the owners of
mining property, known as the Pennsylvania and Jefferson
mines, upon whose land there is the outcropping of a 'goldbearing quartz vein, and the owners of non-mineral surface
land, known as the .Ames Tract, beneath the surface of which
this vern dips. The latter, as plaintiffs, brought suit for
an injunction to prevent defendants, the owners of the Pennsylvania and Jefferson mines, from following and mining
this vein some 500 to 1,000 feet beneath the surface of the
plaintiffs' land, and for an accounting of minerals previously extracted. Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the
superior court in favor of defendants.
The controversy turns upon the priority of title to the
subsurface .of the plaintiffs' land. Defendant mine owners
claim the right to mine extralaterally beneath the plaintiffs'
land by virtue .of the Mining Act of Congress of July 26,
1866 (14 Stats. at Large 251), which recognized and legalized the right of miners, in accordance with existing miners'
rules and regulations, t.o follow a vein which had its apex
upon the surface of their land as it dipped down extralaterally beneath the surface of adjoining government land.
Plaintiffs trace their title back to the Railroad Grant Act
of July 25, 1866 (14 Stats. at Large 239), by which Congress provided for land grants to the California and Oregon
Railroad, later the Central Pacific Railroad, but expressly
excepted mineral lands from the terms of the act. Plaintiffs
contend that since this act was passed one day earlier than
the Mining Act, the railroad received a fee-simple title to
the entire tract, surface and subsurface, so that the Mining
Act passed the next day could in no way operate t.o confer
upon the .owners of adjoining mines the right to mine extralaterally beneath the land granted to the railroad.
On June 14, 1880, the Central Pacific Railroad, pursuant
to its legislative grant, secured a patent to the Ames Tract
which transformed it from a "float" to an established title
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of the Ames Tract, prior to 1866; the securing of a patent
to the Pennsylvania mine in 1880, with a continuous chain
of title to this mine culminating in the present defendants;
and the securing of full rights by defendants as against all
existing claims on the Jefferson mine.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that defendants have not properly established the original location of the Pennsylvania and
Jefferson claims, nor compliance by their predecessors in title
with the miners' rules and regulations necessary to secure
extralateral rights, nor what the rules and regulations were,
maintaining that most of the evidence introduced by the
defendants in these regards is inadmissible as hearsay.
[1] It is clear that Congress intended by the Mining Act
of July 26, 1866, to recognize and give legal validity to all
existing mining claims in accordance with local rules, customs, and regulations, including extralateral rights in those
lands to which such rules and regulations applied. (Lindley, Mines [3d ed.], secs. 40-46; Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S.
453 [25 L. Ed. 240] ; St. Louis Smelting <.& Ref. 00. v. Kemp,
104 U. S.636 [26 L. Ed. 875] ; Morton v.Solwmbo O. M. 00.,
26 Cal. 527.) According to defendants' evidence the Pennsylvania and Jefferson mines clearly fall within the compass
of the act, for prior to its passage their owners located and
mined the vein running extralaterally under the Ames land.
[2] Under the act they acquired legal title to such extralateral rights provided such rights had not been previously conveyed away by the government, for the Mining Act could
not, of course, operate to divest private owners of existing
vested rights. (Lindley, Mines [3d ed.], sec. 611; Amador
Medean Gold M. 00. v. South Spring Hill Gold M. 00., 36
Fed. 668 [13 Sawy. 523] ; Davis v. Wiebbold, 139 U. S. 507
[11 Sup. Ct. 628, 35 L. Ed. 238].)
The plaintiffs contend that the government had previously
conveyed away such rights. They cite the Railroad Grant
Act of July 25, 1866, enacted one day earlier than the MiningAct, which conferred upon the California and Oregon
Railroad, later the Central Pacific Railroad, title to land over
which the railroad agreed to construct a line in the future.
They argue that since in pursuance to this act the Central
Pacific Railroad did locate on certain land, including the
Ames Tract, and secure a patent thereto, the full title in
fee simple passed to the railroad as of July 25, 1866, and
they regard the legal title as having accrued from that date.

!
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(Wisconsin Oentral R. R. ('0. v. Price Oounty, 133 U. S. 496
[10 Sup. Ct. 341, 33 L. Ed. 687] ; Deseret Salt 00. v. Tarpey,
142 U. S. 241 [12 Sup. Ct. 158, 35 L. Ed. 999] ; Jatunn v.
Smith, 95 Cal. 154 [30 Pac. 200].) It is their contention
that the full title to the Ames Tract was conveyed away prior
to the passage of the Mining Act of July 26, 1866, so that
the latter could in no way confer upon the adjoining mines
extralateral rights in the Ames Tract.
[3] This argument might seem persuasive except for one
vital factor. The Railroad Grant Act of July 25, 1866, upon
which the plaintiffs rely for their original title, specifically
excepted from its operation all mineral lands. The terms of
the act make it clear that Congress did not intend to vest
in the railroad title to any mineral lands of the United States.
(Ba.rden v. Northern Pacific R. R. 00., 154 U. S. 288 [14
Sup. Ct. 1030, 38 L. Ed. 992]; United States v. Sweet, 245
U. S. 563 [38 Sup. Ct. 193, 62 L. Ed. 473] ; Broder v. Natoma
Water <.& M. 00., 101 U. S. 274 [25 L. Ed. 790] ; Northern
Pacific R. R. 00. v. Sanders, 166 U. S. 620 [17 Sup. Ct. 671,
41 L. Ed. 1139] ; McClintock v. Bryden et al., 5 Cal. 97 [63
Am. Dec. 87].) The subsurface of the Ames Tract being
clearly mineral could not pass under the terms of the act
but remained in the government, and the Pennsylvania and
Jefferson mines received full· extralateral rights to mine
therein by virtue of the Mining Act of July 26, 1866. (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs cite Davis v. Weibbold, supra, and Amador Medean Gold Mining 00. v. South Spring Ffill Gold Mining
00., supra, to uphold their proposition that the Railroad
Grant Act of July 25, 1866, passed full title to the railroad
at that time as against any subsequently accruing mining
claims. These cases, however, hold orily that at the time of
final and definite location of agricultural or townsite land
full title therein passes to the grantee as against any mineral
rights not then known to exist but coming into being at· a
later time. In the present case there was no final and definite location of the Ames TrRct by the railroad until the
securing of the patent in 1880. Under the act of JUly 25,
1866, it had merely a "floating grant" whereby it might
secure title to land on which it subsequently located. When
the Ames Tract was finally and definitely located in 1880
its subsurface not only was known to be mineral but was
subject to the vested extralateral rights of the adjoining
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mines. The holdings of the Amador-Medean and Davis cases
thus clearly have no application here.
[4] The patent which definitely located and established the
railroad's claim stated that the Ames Tract was agricultural
land. Plaintiffs reason that this statement is conclusive as
to the ~ature of the land since the time for coming in and
attacking the patent has long since expired, and conclude
that since the title to the land secnred by the patent relates
back to the date of the Railroad Grant Act, the full legal
title to the Ames Tract had vested in the railroad before the
conferring of extralateral rights upon the mines. The act
alone, however, cannot be the source of title to any mineral
lands. As Justice Field stated in Barden v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., supra, the Railroad Grant Act of July 25,
1866, when it excepted mineral lands meant that title to all
mineral lands was to remain in the United States, and no
rights to such lands could in any way pass to the railroad.
The patent issued to the railroad by virtue of the act could
legally affect only non-mineral land, and the theory which
relates the title back to the date of the act cannot extend to
"all mineral lands" excepted from the act in express terms.
It follows that title to such mineral lands could be acquired
as against the railroad subsequent to the enactment of the
Railroad Grant Act, and at any time up to the date of the
patent. (Barden v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., supraj
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Sanders, supra.)
[5] Hence, the contentions advanced by plaintiffs can be
resolved into the theory that the patent to the railroad is
conclusive as to the agricultural character of the land. In
support thereof they cite Burke v. Southern Pacific R. R.
Co., 234 U. S. 669 [34 Sup. Ct. 907, 58 L. Ed. 1527] ; West
v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 200 [49 Sup. Ct. 138, 73 L. Ed.
265] ; Davis v. Wiebbold, supra. These cases, however, concern the rights of a mining claim coming into existence after
the securing of the agricultural patent. They stand for the
proposition that the patent is conclusive as to the character
of the land as against mining claims subsequently located.
Such a patent, however, issued merely on the basis of an
ex parte hearing on behalf of the claimant to the land can
in no way abrogate the existing vested extralateral rights of
parties who had nothing to do with the proceedings. (Lawson v. U. S. Mining Co., 207 U. S. 1, 16 [28 Sup. Ct. 15, 52
1;. Ed. 65]; U. S. Mining Co. v. Lawson, 134 Fed. 769, 775,
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776; Clark-Montana R. 00. v. Butte etc. 00., 233 Fed. 547,
556; Butte etc. 00. v. Clark-"l1ontana R. 00., 248 Fed. 609,
615 [160 C. C. A. 509]; Lindley, Mines [3d ed.], sec. 730,
p. 1785.) [6] It is well established that the government
cannot convey away land which it no longer owns and that a
patent cannot cut off prev.iously existing vested rights in the
patented property. (Reynolds v. Iron Silver Mining 00., 116
U. S. 687 [6 Sup. Ct. 601, 29 L. Ed. 774] ; Noyes v. Mantle,
127 U. S. 348, 353, 354 [8 Sup. Ct. 1132, 32 L. Ed. 168];
Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 518-520 [7 Sup. Ct. 985,
30 L. Ed. 1039] ; Leavenworth Lawrence & Galv.eston R. R.
00. v. United States, 92 U. S. 733 [23 L. Ed. 634] ; St. Louis
Smelting & Ref. 00. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 641 [26 L. Ed.
875] ; Davis v. Wiebbold, 139 U. S. 507, 518, 519 [11 Sup.
Ct. 628, 35 L. Ed. 238].) This principle is further supported by the California cases (Van Ness v. Rooney, 160 Cal.
131 [116 Pac. 392]; Ohicago Quartz M. 00. v. Oliver, 75
Cal. 194 [16 Pac. 780, 7 Am. St. Rep. 143] ; Brown v. L1tddy.
121 Cal. App. 494 [9 Pac. (2d) 326]) and by cases in other
jurisdictions (Butte Oity Smokeh01tse Lode Oases, 6 Mont.
397, 401 [12 Pac. 858]; Silver Bow M. & M. 00. v. Clark,
5 Mont. 378, 415 [5 Pac. 570] ; Talbott v. King, 6 Mont. 76
[9 Pac. 434] ; I(ansas Oity etc. 00. v. Clay, 3 Ariz. 326 [29
Pac. 9]; Loney v. Scott, 57 Or. 378 [112 Pac. 172, 173, 32
L. R. A. (N. S.) 466]).
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The patent secured by the railroad in 1880 was issued
under the authority of the Railroad Grant' Act of July 25,
1866, and could in no way apply to mineral land title to
which had been previously vested in others. Any authority
it might acquire in the passage of time as to the nature of
the land, despite the limitations of the act, could operate
only against subsequently located claims. (Van Ness v.
Rooney, supmj Brown v. Luddy, supra.) Thus, the patent
which determined that the Ames Tract was agricultural applied only to the surface of the land and to that portion of
the subsurface not already subject to existing extralateral
rights. (Lindley, Mines [3d ed.], sec. 613, p. 1462.) Whatever claims plaintiffs advance to the subsurface mineral land
of the Ames Tract would have to date from the issuance of
the patent and not from the date of the Railroad Grant Act,
and by the time of the issuance of the patent the extralateral
rights of the Pennsylvania and Jefferson mines in the Ames
'fract had already fully vested by virtue of the Mining Act
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of July 26, 1866. [7] There can be no objection to havmg
the title to the surface in one person and the title to the subsurface in another, a practice recognized at common law
and widely followed today. (Lindley, Mines [3d ed.], sec.
812.)
[8] For the same reasons the state did not, as plaintiffs contend, acquire a fee simple to both the surface and subsurface
of the strip of school land intervening between the Ames
Tract and the mining properties cutting off any extralateral
rights the latter might claim in the former. When the act
of March 3, 1853 (10 Stats. at Large 244), made a grant
of certain sections of each township to the state for school
purposes, it expressly excepted all mineral lands. The land
in question was still unsurveyed and the sections of land
to be granted therefore still undetermined. Following the
survey in 1867, no title could pass from the United States
to 'the state to land determined to be mineral. (West v.
Standard O~l Co., 278 U. S. 200 [49 Sup. Ct. 138, 73 L. Ed.
265]; United States v. Sweet, supraj Barden v. Northern
Pacific R. R. Co., supraj Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Sanders, supraj Ivanhoe M. Co. v. Keystone Consolo M. Co., 102
U. S. 167, 175 [26 L. Ed. 126].) The mineral subsurface
then subject to the vested extralateral rights of the adjoining mines, could therefore not pass to the state under the
terms of the grant.
Even if, as plaintiffs contend, the certification by the Register of the United States Land Office on March 7, 1871, that
there was no claim or filing on this land other than that of
the state had the effect of a patent establishing the complete
title of the state, its determination could be effective only
against subsequently located mining claims and not against
existing vested extralateral rights therein. Saunders v. La
Purisima etc. Co., 125 Cal. 159 [57 Pac. 656], cited by plaintiffs concerned not only a subsequent claim but one with
respect to the surfilCe of the land. In contrast West v. Standard 'Oil Co., 278 U. S. 200 [49 Sup. Ct. 138, 73 L. Ed. 265],
indicates that these certificates issued by the registrars of
local land offices were unauthorized and of no binding effect.
[9] Plaintiffs argue further that the Mining Act of 1872,
by restricting future mining claims asserting extralateral
rights to a maximum of 1500 feet along the vein, precludes the
patent t.o the Pennsylvania mine, secured at a later date, from
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encompassing extralateral rights based upon a greater length.
l'he mining patent cannot thus be limited by that act, however, when issued in pursuance to the earlier act of JUly
26, 1866, on the basis of an earlier location. (Lawson v.
United States Min. Co., 207 U. S. 1 [28 Sup. Ct. 15, 52 L. Ed.
65]; Carson City etc. Min. Co. v. North Star Min. Co., 73
Fed. 597; affd. 83 Fed. 658 [28 C. C. A. 333]; Pennsylvania Consolo Min. Co. v. Grass Valley etc. Co., 117 Fed.
509.) The plaintiffs themselves declare that a patent properly issued and in conformance with the provisions of an
Act of Congress relates the title back to the date of that act.
[10] Furthermore, the additional length of the claim resulted
from the consolidation of three original claims, the lines of
which need not be shown to establish the validity of an existing patent to the consolidated claim on collateral attack. (St.
L01lis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 [26 L. Ed.
875]; Tucker v. Masser, 113 U. S. 203 [5 Sup. Ct. 420, 28
L. Ed. 979]; Peabody Gold Min. Co. v. Gold Hill Min. Co.,
111 Fed. 817 [49 C. C. A. 637].)
[11] Defendants can establish their extralateral rights in
the Ames Tract as owners of the Jefferson mine as well as of
the Pennsylvania mine. While the Jefferson mine was never
patented and was subsequently abandoned and relocated so
that it might be said to constitute a mining claim coming
into existence after the issuance of the patent to the Central
Pacific Railroad for the Ames Tract (Burke v. Southern
Pacific R. R. Co., supra), the deed of the Ames land to the
present plaintiffs from Ebert, their immediate predecessor
in title, specifically reserved to Ebert, his successors and
assigns, the right to follow the Jefferson vein beneath the
Ames land and to mine therefrom. By mesne conveyances,
defendants succeeded to the rights of Ebert under this reservation, by virtue of which they clearly have the right to
follow the vein of the Jefferson mine beneath the surface
of the plaintiffs' land.
[12] As for plaintiffs' contention that regular performance of annual labor is necessary to maintain a good title,
it is well established that title to a mining claim does not
terminate Upon a failure to perform annual labor. The intervention of a third party and a relocation of the ground
must OCcur before any forfeiture can take place. (Lindley,
Mines [3d ed.], sec. 651; Wilbur v. Krushnic, 280 U. S. 306
(50 Sup. Ct. 103, 74 L. Ed. 445] ; Belcher etc. O(). v. De/errari
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62 Cal. 160, 163; Emerson v. McWhirter, 133 Cal. 510 [65
Pac. 1036].) Hence there are no grounds for attacking the
validity of the Pennsylvania claim on this basis. [13] The
plaintiffs are precluded from taking advantage of any forfeiture and subsequent relocation of the Jefferson claim because of the reservation of mining rights in their deed to the
Ames Tract from Ebert.
It remains to consider plaintiffs' contention that the defendants have failed to prove the original location of the
mining claims, their continued existence, compliance with the
miners' rules and regulations, or what these rules and regulations were. The trial court found that the defendants'
evidence established all these things; the question here turns
on whether such evidence is hearsay as plaintiffs contend.
Defendants introduced properly authenticated copies of deeds
and other instruments now of record in the County Recorder's Office in Yuba County, patent records on file in the
official records in the General Land Office in Washington,
D. C., printed official reports of the "Mineral Resources" of
the Public Domain of the West, published under authority
of Congress, and other historical material. This evidence
was supplemented by the oral testimony of two old settlers
that both the Pennsylvania and the Jefferson mines were in
operation on the present location in the early 1860 'so The
case of Kent v. Snyder et al. (1866), 30 Cal. 666, which
mentions in its statement of facts the location of the Jefferson claim by its original owners corroborates the existence
of this claim prior to 1866.
[14] It is a well established exception to the hearsay rule
that evidence of common reputation existing previous to the
controversy may be introduced to prove the existence of
boundaries and facts of a public or general interest more than
thirty years old. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1870.) The original
location of a mine, particularly on government land, is within
the scope of this exception (Muller v. Southern Pacific Branch
Ry. 00., 83 Cal. 240 [23 Pac. 265]; Simons v. Inyo Oerro
Gordo etc. 00.,48 Cal. App. 524 [192 Pac. 144]). Recitals in
ancient deeds (Wilson v. Snow, 228 U. S. 217 [33 Sup. Ct.
487,57 L. Ed. 807] ; Garbarino v. Noce, 181 Cal. 125 [183 Pac.
532, 6 A. L. R. 1433]), and statements in official documents
kept as part of the regular function of the office by some
department of the government or authorized by the legislature are likewise recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.
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(Code Civ. Proc., secs. 1920, 1924; Ohesapeake & Delaware
Oanal 00. v. Unit·ed States, 250 U. S. 123 [39 Sup. Ct. 407, 63
L. Ed. 889].)

:!

[15] The evidence introduced by the defendants is admissible to prove the proper location and existence of the mining
claims under these ex'ceptions to the hearsay rule. The patent records containing abstracts of title to the mining claims,
recitals as to the location of these claims in several ancient
deeds, verified statements as to the location and possession
of the mines, a copy of the articles of incorporation of the
early Pennsylvania Mining Corporation, a certified COpy of
the minutes of meetings of the Quartz Miners of Brown's
Valley, descriptions of the claims by metes and bounds, the
Register's final certificate of entry of the patent, and the
field notes of survey and report of the United States Deputy
Mineral Surveyor on the Pennsylvania mine are clearly records kept in the usual course of business by the General Land
Office and thus admissible as official documents. (Oulver v.
Uthe, 133 U. S. 655 [10 Sup. Ct. 415, 33 L. E'd. 776] ; Galt v.
Galloway, 29 U. S. 332 [7 L. Ed. 876] ; People v. Hagar, 52
Cal. 171.) [16] So, too, the official report of the Mineral Resources of the Public Domain of the West being published
under the direct authority of Congress as an official report
to the Secretary of the Treasury falls into the category of
an official document, the contents of which are admissible to
show the location and working of the mines in pursuance
to the miners' rules and regulations then in existence. [17]
In addition, since these locations may be proven by evidence
of general reputation previous to the controversy there is
no reason why the defendants cannot introduce the History
of Yuba County by Chamberlain and Wells (1879) for such
a purpose. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1936.) Thus, the finding
by the trial court that a valid location was made is a legitimate finding of fact supported by admissible evidence. (Altoona Q. M. 00. v. Integral Q. M. 00., 114 Cal. 100 [45 Pac.
1047] ; Gruwell v. Rocca, 141 Cal. 417 [74 Pac. 1028] j Harris v. Kellogg, 117 Cal. 484 [49 Pac. 708]; Oolman v. mements, 23 Cal. 245 j Adams v. Orawford, 116 Cal. 495 [48
Pac. 488].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Ward, J., pro tem., Peters, J.,
pro tem., and Gibson~ C. J., concurred.
17
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CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent.
The majority opinion in this case is so lacking in logical
reasoning and unsupported by authority that it can truthfully be said that it is basically unsound.
While my past experience as a practical miner and natural
leaning toward the mining industry should cause me to favor
the conclusion reached in the majority opinion, I am pursuaded by considerations of both reason and authority that
such conclusion is contrary to settled principles of law, sound
reasoning, and every consideration of equity and natural justice.
The conclusion reached in the majority opinion not only
renders insecure and subject to collateral attack every railroad patent in this state, but it places the same cloud upon
every agricultural patent which has been issued within the
last seventy-five years.
The gist of the majority opinion in this case is that the
railroad company by its patent obtained title to the surface
of the Ames Tract only, and that the predecessors in interest
of the mining company obtained title to the subsurface of said
tract. In my opinion this view is palpably erroneous for the .
reason that it is the settled rule, and the authorities are uni- .~
form in holding, that a patent to a railroad company issued
pursuant to the so-called Railroad Grant Acts conveys thereby
a common law fee in nonmineral land. (Lawson v. U. S.
Mining Company, 207 u. S. 1 [28 Sup. Ct. 15, 52 L.Ed.
65] ; A:mador Medean Gold Mining Co. v. South Spring Hill
Gold Mining Co., 36 Fed. 668 [13 Sawy. 523].)
Section 829 of our Civil Code provides: "The owner of land
in fee has the right to the surface and to everything permanently situated beneath or above it."
No attempt is made in the majority opinion to define the
limits of the so-called surface and subsurface ownerships.
Nothing is said therein to indicate whether or not it is meant
that the owner of the surface may penetrate into the subsurface to any extent, or if so, to what extent; in other
words, under this announced new doctrine, may the owner of
the surface dig a post hole, a cellar, or sink a well? If he
may do these things, how much further may he go'
The effect of the holding of the majority opinion is to grant
to the owner of the Pennsylvania and Jefferson claims all of
the mineral deposits which may be under the surface ~f the

Ames Tract whether or not the same constitute the extralateral dip of veins apexing on said claims; in other words,
by holding that the railroad company got no title to the
mineral deposited in the Ames Tract because by its patent it
simply got title to the surface of said tract, and that the
predecessor in interest of the defendant got title to the subsurface of said tract, the plaintiffs in this action are deprived
of the right to extract mineral deposits from said tract even
though they have no connection or relation to the veins apexing on the Pennsylvania and Jefferson claims.
The majority opinion grants to the defendant much broader
rights than those claimed by the defendant itself, as the right
claimed by the defendant in this case is based exclusively upon
the extralateral right doctrine and not otherwise.
The rights flowing from the extralateral right doctrine have
many restrictions and limitations and certainly do not include
the entire subsurface of the land into which veins may dip.
First, some of those limitations are expressed in the law establishing and confirming such rights. In 30 U. S. C. A. 26, it
is provided in part: "The locators ... shall have the exclusive right of possession . . . of all the surface included within
the lines of their location, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges
throughout their entire depth, the top or apex of which lies
inside of such surface lines extended downward vertically,
although such veins, lodes or ledges may so depart from a
perpendicular in their course downward as to extend outside
the vertical side lines of such surface locations. But their
right of possession to ·such outside parts of such veins or
ledges shall be confined to wch portions thereof as lie between vertical planes drawn downward as above described,
through the end lines of their locations, so continued in their
own direction that such planes will intersect such exterior
parts of suc4 veins or ledges. Nothing in this section shall
authorize the locator or possessor of a vein or lode which
extends in its downward course beyond the vertical lines of
his claim to enter upon the surface of a claim owned or possessed by another."
Second, it is elementary that to have extralateral rights in
a vein, the apex thereof must be on the location. (Costigan
Mining Law, p. 409 e1; seq.; 30 U. S. C. A. 26.)
Third, the identity and continuity of the vein must be established and it must have an apex and a dip. As stated in
Costigan on Mining Law, page 410:
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"The identity and substantial continuity of the vein from
its apex down is essential to the existence of extralateral rights
on the vein, and there are no extralateral rights unless the
vein has an apex and a dip." And in this connection the
presumption is that no dip exists. (Costigan on Mining Law,
p. 411; Lindley on Mines [3d ed.1, sec. 615.)
Fourth, extralateral rights do not extend to secondary veins
which croSS the principal vein at right angles. (Costigan
on Mining Law, p. 440.)
To say that the subsurface rights were acquired by the
mining patentees is manifestly unsound. The most that they
can claim are the extralateral rights and certainly such rights
do not embrace all of the subsurface rights nor all of the
right to all of the mineral under the surface of the Ames
Tract. This is forcefully illustrated by the rule that extralateral rights only extend along the dip of the vein, that is,
continue only as long as the vein runs downward in its lateral
extension. If it at any time runs parallel or upward then
the extralateral rights cease. It is said in 40 C. J. 819:
"An extralateral right applies to the vein only on its downward course or dip, outside the side lines, and does not authorize a locator to follow the vein on its course or strike
outside the boundaries of the claim, as where it becomes flat- :!
tened and extends from thence horizontally in a departure
from the general plane of the vein, or for any considerable
distance takes an upward trend."
In Tom Reed Gold MirlJes 00. v. United Eastern Mining 00.,
24 Ariz. 269 [209 Pac. 283, 2871, it is said:
"The authorities construing this section hold (1) that the
vein to which this extralateral right is claimed must be followed on its 'course downward' and. (2) that the right attaches
only to the identical vein which has its apex within the location, and not to another and different vein lying outside the
vertical boundaries of the claim. Both these conditions must
. exist, and are independently essential to the right of extralateral possession and enjoyment. We treat of them in order:
"(1) The vein must be pursued on its course downward.
"In Stewart M. 00. v. Ontario M. 00., 23 Idaho, 724, 132
Pac. 787, it was said:
" 'Sometimes it may happen that the' downward course'
of a vein will be perpendicular, and the vein will form a
vertical plane, but, as a rule, there is a deflection in the

'"
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downward course of these mineral veins from the perpendicular, and we call this their dip; but still the course of the dip
is always' downward,' and, when the plane of the vein reaches
the horizontal, then we have a blanket vein or lode, and on
such a vein a locator has no extralateral right . ... The Supreme Court always qualifies its holdings in this respect by
the condition of the statute that the course between those
vertical planes must be downward.'
"In Southern Nevada G. db S. M. Co. v. Holmes M. Co.,
27 Nev. 103, 73 Pac. 759, 103 Am. St. Rep. 759, it was held:
" 'If the defendant entered upon a ledge having its apex
within the exterior boundaries of plaintiff's location, and extracted ore therefrom between the planes drawn vertically
downward through the end lines of said location, the right
of the plaintiff to recover damages for such acts would not
be affected by proof merely that the place from which such ore
was extracted could be reached by going continuously through
ledge matter from a ledge having its apex within the exterior
boundaries of a prior location belonging to the defendant,
but it must further appear that such passage from the apex
of defendant's ledge is made continuously downward on the
dip of that ledge, and if any portion of such passage must
necessarily be made either upward, or laterally along the
strike, then the plaintiff's right to recover is not affected.'
"See Lindley on Mines (3d ed.) sections 319 and 589, and
St. Louis M. Co. v. Montana M. Co., 113 Fed. 900, 51 C. C. A.
530, 64 L. R. A. 207; Id., 194 U. S. 235, 24 Sup. Ct. 654, 48
L. Ed. 953.
"While the authorities which have passed upon the question
are but few in number, there would seem to be no reason to
doubt that the excerpts we have quoted state the true rule,
which is that no extralateral right exists to a vein, lode, or
ledge beyond the point where in its course outside the claim
of apex it becomes flattened and extends from thence horizontally in a departure from the approximate general plane
of the vein in its downward course, or for any considerable
distance takes an upward trend."
Sixth, the holder of such rights has no general exploratory
rights under another'~ land, and he cannot tunnel through
the other's land to reach his vein, or as it is said in St. Louis
Min. & M~7,l. CQ. v. Montana Min. Co., 113 Fed. 900 [5)
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C. C. A. 530, 64 L. R. A. 207] (affirmed: 194 U. S. 235 [24
Sup. Ct. 654, 48 L. Ed. 953]), at page 902:
"They are given the right of possession of the surface and
of everything within their own claim except the veins or lodes
therein, which may have their apices in the surface of another
claim, so as to give the owner of the latter extralateral rights,
and they are given the right to follow outside of their side
lines and into adjoining claims all veins or lodes which have
their apices in their own claims, so as to confer extralateral
rights. This is their right, and no mo'l'e. There is no warrant for saying that they have any general right of exploraticm within land of an adjoining patented claim, whether upon
or below the surface. The right of exploration is given for the
purpose of making discovery of mineral. Of what avail would
be the right of exploration if no benefit could be obtained
from discovery made thereby 1 The ground covered by a
subsisting, valid mineral location is open to exploration only
by the owner thereof. The statute gives the appeJlants the
right to follow the vein which they were seeking to reach by
the tunnel, but it confers upon them no right to approach
it from any point other than from the vein or lode itself."
It is a matter of common knowledge among persons familiar
with mineral deposits, and I know from my own experience,
that two or more distinct mineral deposits may exist in such
close proximity that they may be covered by a single mineral
location; hence, it is possible that there are mineral veins
underlying the surface of the Ames Tract which mayor may
not be subject to the extralateral right of mining claims located on adjacent land. By holding that the railroad company got title to the surface of the Ames Tract only, the plaintiffs would be barred from extracting the mineral from said
deposits under the rule announced in the majority opinion.
This doctrine of surface and subsurface ownerships finds no
support in the decided cases in this or any other country
w4ere the common law. prevails. The only authority for it
cited in the majority opinion is Lindley on Mines, Third Edition, section 812. While the language used by this author in
connection with this particular subject matter is very vague,
he frankly states that it is a "radical doctrine".
I feel then that I am justified in saying that the majority
opinion stands alone in the enunciation of this unsound and
unsupported doctrine. In this respect it may be said that
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said opinion is a hybrid, and like the quadruped noted for
its stubbornness, it is "without pride of ancestry or hope of
posterity".

-!r

:~

The specific question which we are called upon to determine
in this case is whether the defendant has the right to follow a
vein of gold bearing quartz apexing on its mining claim which
dips extralaterally from defendant's mining claim into plaintiffs' land, the eastern boundary of which is parallel with,
but 200 feet west of the western boundary of said mining
claim, where plaintiffs' title originated by virtue of the Railroad Grant Act of JUly 25, 1866, was confirmed by a patent
issued to the Central Pacific Railway Company on June 14,
1880, and by mesne conveyances vested in plaintiffs.
No claim is made by defendant that either the railroad
company or any of the government officials had any knowledge whatever that the Ames land contained a mineral deposit
or that it Was other than nonmineral land at the time the
patent was issued. Said land was duly classified as nonmineral by the United States Land Office, and a patent therefor was duly and regularly issued pursuant to said Railroad
Grant Act. The railroad company thereafter conveyed a
fee title to said land to the predecessor in interest of plaintiffs, and this title was ultimately conveyed to plaintiffs.
The United States Supreme Court has uniformly held that
there must be a time at which title to land must be settled,
and has determined that said time shall be at the date of
issuance of patent.
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Since mineral lands are excluded from the grants in aid
of railroads, before patent can issue to railroad lands, there
must be a determination as to whether or not the land is
mineral or nonmineral in character, that is, whether it is
more valuable for mining or agricultural purposes.
The duty of making such a decision devolves upon the General Land Office, whose decision is in the nature of a quasijudicial determination, and conclusive thereafter as against
collateral attack.

i
,i

As the majority opinion does not contain either a complete
or correct statement of the facts of this case, I will make a
statement of the essen~ial facts before proceeding with a discussion of the legal principles applicable thereto.
This is an appeal from a judgment for defendant in an action in ejectment. Although plaintiffs asked for an injunc-
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tion and accounting in the same action, it was agreed by
stipulation of the parties that trial of the issue of damages
should be held in abeyance until the question of title had been
determined on appeal. Therefore, that question only is now
before this court.
The action arose out of a dispute over the title to a vein
of gold bearing quartz which extends extralaterally under the
land of the plaintiffs from an apex on mining claims in the
possession of the defendant.
Defendant admittedly has been extracting the ore from
said vein, and maintains its right to do so by virtue of its
ownership of the apex of said vein within said mining claims.
The land belonging to the plaintiffs hereinafter called" the
Ames tract", is described by legal subdivision as the S. W. 14
of section 15, T. 16 N. R. 5 E., M. D. B. & M., situated in
Yuba County, California. The inception of the Ames title is
an Act of Congress, effective July 25, 1866 (14 U. S. Stat.
A. L. 239), granting to the California and Oregon Railway
Company certain lands "to aid in the construction of a railroad". Mineral lands were excepted from this grant. Upon
completion of the railroad, a map showing its location was
filed in the United States Land Office, July 27, 1870. Thereafter, the Central Pacific Railroad Company succeeded to the
rights of the California and Oregon Railway Company and
received a United States patent for lands, including the Ames
land, on June 14, 1880. Plaintiffs acquired title to the Ames
Tract through a deed from J. E. Ebert, who had succeeded to
the railroad title.
The defendant's land is located in the S. E. 14 of section 16,
T. 16 N. R. 5 E., M. D. B. & M., which adjoins said section
15 on the west. It consists of two quartz mining claims, known
as the Pennsylvania and Jefferson claims, which defendant
holds under lease and option from the owners. These claims
and the Ames Tract are not adjacent, for a strip of school
land two hundred feet in width lies between them. The
claims, both four hundred feet in width, are located contiguously on a north and south vein of gold bearing quartz, and
have side lines substantially parallel with the section line
between said sections 15 and 16. The Jefferson claim extends seven hundred fifty feet north from the south line of
section 16. The Pennsylvania claim joins the Jefferson claim
at its north boundary and continues northward for a distance
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of one thousand five hundred forty feet. The vein which ex.
tends throughout the length of these two claims dips extra.
laterally under the narrow strip of school land and continues
into the Ames property.
The Act of Congress under which defendant asserts its title
to the Pennsylvania and Jefferson claims authorized the disposal of mineral lands from the public domain and became
effective July 26, 1866 (14 U. S. Stat. A. L. 251). Complying with the provisions of this statute, one of defendant's
predecessors secured a patent to the Pennsylvania mining
claim. The first application for said patent was made in
January, 1874, but because of adverse proceedings and a
technical defect, this application was denied with leave to
renew. The renewal was made January 22, 1880. Thereafter, on May 31, 1880, the local land office receiver at
Marysville issued his receipt for money paid by applicant, and
the register of said office issued his final certificate of entry.
Patent to the Pennsylvania claim was issued by the United
States Government on August 18, 1880, to the Pennsylvania
Mining Company, which company was incorporated in 1863.
The Jefferson claim is unpatented but held by location.
Although the earliest recorded location of this, claim apparently was made in 1891, defendant claims its predecessors have
worked both the Pennsylvania and Jefferson claims since the
early days of California.
The strip of school land which separates the mining claims
from the Ames Tract was granted to the State of California
under the Act of Congress dated March 3, 1853 (10 U. S.
Stat. A. L. 244), which granted the 16th and 36th sections
of each township for school purposes. The grant of these
sections also was subject to the reservation of mineral lands.
The lands were then unsurveyed, the survey of them being
completed August 6, 1867. On May 22, 1882, the eastern
one-half of the S. E. quarter of section 16, in which were
located the two mining claims, was conveyed by patents of
the State of California to certain grantees, I. S. Belcher and
W. C. Belcher, who later conveyed their titles under the state
patents to the Pennsylvania Mining Company, a predecessor
of the defendant.
In its statement of ,facts the majority opinion says: "On
June 14, 1880, the Central Pacific Railroad, pursuant to its
legislative grant, secured a patent to the Ames tract, which
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transformed it from a 'float' to an established title by the
definite location of the railroad line." Again l,ater the statement is made that "In the present case there was no final
and definite location of the Ames tract by the railroad until
the securing of the patent in 1880"; and further that "The
patent which definitely located and established the railroad's
claim stated that the Ames tract was agricultural land. " The
first of these statements is to say the least ambiguous and the
other two indicate a complete lack of understanding as to
the time of the vesting of title to railroad land.
The securing of a patent has nothing to do with the actual
vesting of title to railroad land. It is merely a confirmation
of a title which has already vested. It is too well settled to
admit of argument that grants in aid of railroads are grants
made in praesenti, and that where the line of such roads is not
located the grant remains a float, but that when the route
of the road is definitely fixed, the sections granted become
susceptible of identification, and the title attaches to them
and took effect as of the date of the grant cutting off all intervening claims. (Wisconsin Oentral Railroad 00. v. Price
00., 133 U. S. 496, 509 [10 Sup. Ct. 341, 33 L. Ed. 687];
Deseret Salt 00. v. Tarpey, 142 U. S. 241 [12 Sup. Ct. 158,
35 L. Ed. 999] ; Jatunn v. Smith, 95 Cal. 154 [30 Pac. 200].) -!
Confirmation of this title by patent also relates back to the
date of the original grant, thereby cutting off all intervening
rights.
The majority opinion states as a contention of the plaintiffs "that the full title to the Ames tract was conveyed away
prior to the passage of the Mining Act of July 26, 1866, so
that the latter could in no way confer upon the adjoining
mines extralateral rights in the Ames tract." Then continues with "This argument might seem persuasive except
'for one vital factor. The Railroad Grant Act of July 25,
1866, upon which the plaintiffs rely for their original title,
specifically excepted from its operation all mineral lands.
The terms of the Act make it clear that Congress did not
intend to vest in the railroad title to any mineral lands of
the United States (Barden v. No. Pacific R. R. 00., 154
'U. S. 288 [14 Sup. Ct. 1030, 38 L. Ed. 992] ; United States
v. Sweet, 245 U. S. 563 [38 Sup. Ct. 193, 62 L. Ed. 473];
Broder v. Natona Water db M. 00., 101 U. S. 274 [25 L. Ed.
790] ; No. Pacific R. R. 00. v. Sanders, 166 U. S. 620 [17 Sup.
,Ct. 671, 41 L. Ed. 1139] ; McOlintock v. Bryden et al., 5 Cal.
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97 [63 Am. Dec. 87J)." This much of the opinion's statement is true-that the Railroad Grant Act excepted mineral
lands, and that Congress did not intend thereby to vest in
the railroad title to any mineral lands in the United States.
But the next statement in the opinion is completely false
and unsupported by the cases cited in its favor,-namely, that
"The subsurface of the Ames Tract being clearly mineral
could not pass under the terms of the Act but remained in
the Government, and the Pennsylvania and Jefferson mines
received full extralateral rights to mine therein by virtue of
the Mining Act of July 26, 1866.
In the Barden case, supra, the Northern Pacific R. R. Company claimed title to lands admittedly mineral in character
not by virtue of a patent thereto, but on the ground that
the lands were not known to be mineral until after the filing
of its map showing the location of its road, and that therefore they passed to the railroad company at said time. The
court held, and correctly so, that the time for final determination of the character of the land was not the date of the
filing of the map of definite location, but the date of the
issuance of patent thereto. In the present case, however, the
railroad company secured a patent to the land in question.
The Barden case, supra, stating that the plaintiffs therein
had no cause for apprehending that its decision would lead
to uncertainty of titles, proceeded to discuss the results which
would obtain if a patent were issued:
"We do not think that any apprehension of disturbance in
titles from the views we assert need arise. The law places
under the supervision of the Interior Department and its
subordinate officers, acting under its direction, the control of
all matters affecting the disposition of public lands of the
United States, and the adjustment of private claims to them
under the legislation of Congress. It can hear contestants
and decide upon the respective merits of their claims. It can
investigate and settle the contentions of all persons with respect to such claims. It can hear evidence upon and determine the character of lands to which different parties assert
a right; and when the controversy before it is fully considered
and ended, it can iss1,le to the rightful claimant the patent
provided by law, specifying that the lands are of the character for which a patent is authorized. It can thus determine
whether the lands called for are swamp lands, timber lands,
agricultural lands, or mineral lands, and so designate them in
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the patent which it issues. The Act of Congress making the
grant to the plaintiff provides for the issue of a patent to
the grantee for the land claimed, and as the grant excludes
mineral lands in the direction for such patent to issue, the
Land Office can examine into the character of the lands, and
designate it in its conveyance.
"It is the established doctrine, expressed in numerous decisions of this court, that wherever Oongress has provided for
the disposition of any portion of the public lands, of a particular character, and authorizes the officers of the Land Department to issue a patent for such land upon ascertainment
of certain facts, that department has jurisdiction to inquire
into and determine as to the existence of such facts, and in
the absence of fraud, imposition, or mistake, its determination is conclusive against collateral attack." (Italics added.)
The cases cited in the majority opinion as authority for
the statement that "by the terms of the Act it is clear Congress did not intend to vest in the railroad title to any mineral
lands of the United States", support this statement with
which I am in full accord. However, none of them is authority for the statement which follows to the effect that the
subsurface of the Ames Tract being clearly mineral could not .
pass under the terms of the act and remained in the govern- ~
ment.
The case of United States v. Sweet, supra, involved a question as to whether 40 acres of land known to be valuable
for coal before Utah became a state, passed to the state by
a school land grant which neither expressly included nor
excluded mineral lands. The court held that the grant was
to be read in the light of the mining laws, the school land indemnity law providing for lieu selections where sections 16
and 36 were mineral, and the settled policy of Congress respecting mineral lands, and concluded that the sections known
to be mineral when the grant took effect did not pass under
the grant.
In the case of Broder v. Natona Water 00., supra, defendant's right to maintain a canal over the lands of the plaintiff
was upheld although it was constructed over lands subsequently granted to a railroad company, by reason of the
fact that Congress had previous to the Railroad Grant Act
enacted a statute conferring on owners of such canals a preexisting right. It does not appear, however, from a reading
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of the case that the railroad company's lands were ever
patented to it.
The case of No. Pacific R. R. 00. v. Sanders, supra, does
not involve a case in which the railroad company ever obtained a patent to the lands in controversy. The question
decided therein was merely that where, at the time of the
definite location of plaintiff's road, applications of record were
pending to purchase said lands, said applications were
"claims" within the meaning of the granting act, which excluded therefrom lands "not free from preemption or other
claims or rights at the time the line of said road is definitely
fiXed."

McClintock v. Bryden et al., Supra, is an early decision of
this court holding that where a person settles on any of the
mining lands of this state, he settles on there subject to the
rights of miners, who may proceed in good faith to extract
valuable minerals therefrom in the most practicable manner
in which they can be extracted, with least injury to the oc.
cupying claimant, according to the express statutes of this
state, even though the agricultural settler settled on the lands
prior to said statute.
As can be readily seen none of these cases has any direct
bearing on the case at bar. They are authority for the general propositions that mineral lands were excluded from a
granting act and do not pass thereby to the grantee, but
they in nowise militate against the decision in the Barden
case, supra, that, when C\ determination has been made by the
General Land Office that lands to whicli application for patent
hq,s been made are nonmineral in character, and has isstted
a patent pursuant to said decis1:on, that said determination is
conclusive, and that regardless of the fact that the lands may
thereafter appear to contain mineral in paying quantities. a
common law fee conveying title to the center of the earth has
passed to the patentees. (Italics added.)
The majority opinion cites and relies upon the cases of
Van Ness v. Rooney, 160 Cal. 131 [116 Pac. 392], Brown v.
L1tddy, 121 Cal. App. 494 [9 Pac. (2d) 326], and Ohicago
Quartz Mining 00. v. Oliver, 75 Cal. 194 [16 Pac. 780, 7 Am.
St. Rep. 143], as authority for its statement that" It is well
established that the government cannot convey away land
which it no longer owns and that a patent cannot cut off
previously existing vested rights in the patented property."
In this connection said opinion further states: "The patent
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secured by the railroad in 1880 ,was issued under the authority of the Railroad Grant Act of July 25, 1866, and could in
no way apply to mineral land,title to which had been previously vested in others. Any authority it might acquire in the
passage of time as to the nature of the land, despite the limitations of the Act, could operate only against subsequently
located claims. (Van Ness v. Rooney, supra; Brown v.
Luddy, supra.)"
It is worthy of note that the last cited cases have not been
cited or referred to in the voluminous briefs, petitions, or
printed or oral argument presented to this court by the eminent counsel on either side of this case. These counsel, or
at least some of them, are specialists in the field of mining law,
and I feel justified in stating that if the principles of law
announced in these cases had any relevancy or application
to the legal problems involved in this case, or could possibly
form the basis for a legal theory upon which this case could
be decided, those cases and the principles of law enunciated
therein would certainly have been called to the attention of
this court by such counsel.
Aside from my own study and analysis of said cases, which
has convinced me that they have no application to the legal .
problems involved in the case at bar, the failure of eminent .~
counsel for defendant to cite or rely upon them as a basis for
the determination of this case, convinces me beyond the possibility of a doubt that said cases cannot be relied upon in support of the conclusion reached in the majority opinion in this
case.
I have long been familiar with the case of Van Ness v.
Rooney, supra. It arose in the county where I was born and
raised and was the subject of much discussion there for many
years; in fact, I called the same to the attention of the author
of the majority opinion. The decision of this case, both by
the trial court and this court, was predicated upon the proposition that a patent for land included in a railroad grant
which expressly excludes and excepts from the lands described in the granting clause" all mineral lands, should any
such be found in the tracts aforesaid", does not pass title
to a mineral claim included therein w~ich had been duly and
legally located prior to the issuance of the patent. Obviously, such is not the problem involved in the case at bar.
Furthermore, the case of Van Ness v. Rooney, supra, was
decided by this court prior to the decision by the Supreme
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Court of the United States of the case of Burke v. So. Pacific R. R. 00., 234 U. S. 669 [34 Sup. Ct. 907, 58 L. Ed.
1527J, which held that an exception inserted in patents issued under the Railroad Grant Act to the effect that if any
of the lands described should be found to be mineral the
same should be excluded from the operation of the patent is
unauthorized and void, because the granting act contemplated
that the patents should effectually and unconditionally pass
the title to the land granted. In my opinion the decision of
this court in the case of Van Ness v. Rooney, supra, is in direct conflict with the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Burke v. So. Pacific R. R. 00.,
supra, and the Van Ness case, supra, can no longer be considered an authority for the legal proposition decided therein.
The case of Brown v. Luddy, supra, follows the decision of
this court in the Van Ness case, supra, and the conclusion
reached by the District Court of Appeal in the Brown case,
supra, is predicated almost entirely if not wholly upon the
theory advanced by this court in the Van Ness case, supra.
The factual situation in the case of Brown v. Luddy, supra,
was however, quite different than that in the Van Ness case,
supra, and there is no similarity between the facts in either
of those cases and the case at bar. In the Brown case, supra,
the plaintiffs' mining claim was located and had been in
existence and was being actually operated at the time of
the passage of the statute authorizing the issuance of the
stock-raising homestead patent which was the basis of defendants' title in said case; said statute and the patent issued
to Luddy expressly reserved to the United States "all coal
and other minerals in the land". This is quite different than
the provision in the patent issued to the railroad company in
the Van Ness case, supra, which excepted" all mineral lands ".
In my opinion the decision of the District Court of Appeal in
the case of Brown v. Luddy, supra, announces principles of
law much broader than was necessary to the decision of the
legal propositions involved in said case, but in any event,
it cannot be said to be authority supporting the position of
the defendant here because the factual situation there was
entirely different than that which obtains in the case at bar.
The majority opinion also cites the case of Ohicago Quartz
Mining 00. v. Oliver, 75 Cal. 194 [16 Pac. 780, 7 Am. St.
Rep. 143], as announcing the same principle of law as that
enunciated in the cases of Van Ness v. Rooney and Brown v.
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Luddy, supra. The first mention of the Ohicago Quartz Mining 00. case by any of the counsel in the case at bar was on
October 9, 1940, when this case was argued for the second
time before this court. It was then called to the court's
attention by counsel for defendant in an outline of oral reargument. The Ohicago Quartz Mining 00. case holds that
a patent issued by the United States Government to the
Central Pacific R. R. 00. for land included within the boundaries of the grant made to it by the Act of Oongress of July 1,
1862, is not conclusive evidence that the land covered by the
patent is nonmineral in character, and a person claiming the
land under a subsequent mining patent may show that the
land is mineral, and therefore excepted from the operation
of the grant to the railroad company.
The decision in this case is in direct conflict with the now
settled rule that the issuance of a patent to a railroad company
under the Railroad Grant Act conclusively determines the
nonmineral character of the land that the provision in such
a patent excepting mineral land therefrom is void and the
title conveyed to the railroad company by such patent is a
title in fee to nonmineral land. (Burke v. So. Pacific R. R.
00., $upra.)
It appears from the opinion of this court in the Ohicago -l'
Quartz Mining 00. case that the mining company there was
claiming under patent to a mining claim issued approximately
thirteen years subsequent to the patent issued to the railroad
company, and there is no statement in the opinion of this court
from which the conclusion can be drawn that the claim of the
mining company to its mineral location antedated the patent
to the railroad company. This case appears to have been
decided upon the theory that the railroad company did not
get title to the land embraced within its patent because the
land involved in the action was valuable gold bearing mineral
land, and known to be such at the time of the issuance of the
railroad patent. As stated above, the decision of this court in
the Ohicago Quartz Mining 00. case is in direct conflict with
decisions of the Supreme Oourt of the United States and subsequent decisions of this court. (See Paterson v. Ogden, 141
Oal. 43 174 Pac. 443, 99 Am. St. Rep. 31] ; Jameson v. James,
155 Oal. 275 [100 Pac. 700].)
The majority opinion makes the statement that "When the
Ames tract was finally and definitely located in 1880, its subsurface was not only known to be mineral but was subject
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to the vested extralateral rights of the adjoining mines." I
presume this statement must be interpreted to mean that,
when the Ames Tract was patented, its subsurface was not
only known to be mineral but was subject to the vested extralateral rights of the adjoining miners.
The majority opinion does not, however, state by whom the
subsurface of the Ames Tract was !'known to be mineral".
Defendant claims to have known that the Pennsylvania mineral vein underlay the Ames Tract at the time of its patenting.
It does not appear, however, that such fact Was known to
anyone else. There is no doubt that the act granting land to
the railroad companies excluded mineral lands. However, the
Supreme Oourt of the United States has held that a secure
title to such lands must vest at some time and has set that
time as the date of the issuance of patent. It is necessary
therefore, at that time, said court has held, that land should
be determined actually to be mineral or nonmineral. (Barden
v. No. Pacific R. R. 00., supra; Shaw v. KeUogg, 170 U. S.
312,337 [18 Sup. Ot. 632,42 L. Ed. 1050].) Since the duty
of determining the character of land devolves upon the General Land Office, the Supreme Oourt of the United States
has held that the persons to whom the land must be known
to be mineral must be the officers of the Land Department in
charge of the disposition of public lands. The court recognized that said officers might often from the information
available to them determine lands to be nonmineral which in
fact contained mineral in quantities sufficient to render the
land more valuable for mineral than agricultural purposes;
nevertheless it has regarded the settling of the title to land
at a definite date to be of such importance that if the land
were not shown or known to be such by said officers at the
time of patent their determination at said time as to the nonmineral character of the land has, in the absence of fraud, been
held thereafter to be conclusive. The Supreme Oourt of the
United States expressed this view in Barden v. No. Pacific
R. R. 00., supra, at page 329, as follows:
"There are undoubtedly many cases arising before the
Land Department in the disposition of the public lands where
it will be a matter of much difficulty on the part of its officers to ascertain with accuracy whether the lands to be disposed of are to be deemed mineral lands or agricultural lands,
and in such cases the rule adopted that they will be considered
mineral or agricultural as they are more valuable in the one
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class or the other, may be sound. The officers will be governed by the knowledge of the lands obtained at the time as
to their real character. The determination of the fact by
those officers that they are one or the other will be considered
as conclusive." That a patent is conclusive of the real character of the land even where issued without hearing and determination on that point was settled in the Barden case,
supra, where Mr. Justice Field said:
"It is true that the patent has been issued in many instances without the investigation and consideration which the
public interest requires; but if that has been done without
fraud, though unadvisedly by officers of the government
charged with the duty of supervising and attending to the
preparation and issue of such patents, the consequence must
b~ borne by the government until by further legislation a
stricter regard to their duties in that respect can be enforced
upon them. The fact remains that under the law the duty of
determining the character of the lands granted by Congress,
and stating it in instruments transferring the title of the government to the grantees, reposes in officers of the Land Department. "
Likewise, in Burke v. So. Pacific R. R. Co., supra, at page
709, the court said:
"Taking up the several questions in the light of what we
have said, we answer them as follows:
"Did the said grant to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company include mineral lands which were known to be such at
or prior to the date of the patent of JUly 10, 18941
"Answer.-Minerallands, known to be such at or prior to
the issue of patent, were not included in the grant but excluded from it, and the duty of determining the character of
the lands was cast primarily on the Land Department, which
was charged with the issue of patents.
"Does a patent to a railroad company under a grant which
~xcludes mineral lands, as in the present case, but which is
issued without any investigation upon the part of the officers
of the Land Office or of the Department of the Interior as to
the quality of the land, whether agricultural or mineral, and
without hearing upon or determination of the quality of the
lands, operate to convey lands which· are thereafter ascertained to be mineral Y
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"Answer.-A patent issued in such circumstances is irregularly issued, undoubtedly so, but as it is the act of a legally
constituted tribunal and is done within its jurisdiction, it is
not void and therefore passes the title (Noble v. Union River
Logging Railroad [Co.] 147 U. S. 165, 174-175 [37 L. Ed.
123, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 271]), subject to the right of the Government to attack the patent by a direct suit for its annulment if the land was known to be mineral when the patent
issued. McLaughlin v. United States, 107 U. S. 526 [27
L. Ed. 621, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862] ; Western Pacific Railroad
Co. v. United States, 108 U. S. 510 [27 L. Ed. 806, 2 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 802]." (See also, West v. Standard Oil Co., 278
U. S. 200, 211 [49 Sup. Ct. 138, 73 L. Ed. 265].)
"Is the reservation and exception contained in the grant
in the patent to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company void
and of no effect Y
"Answer.-The mineral land exception in the patent is
void.
"If the reservation of mineral lands as expressed in the
patent is void, then is the patent, upon a collateral attack, a
conclusive and official declaration that the land is agricultural
and that all the requirements preliminary to the issuance
of the patent have been complied with Y
"Answer.-It is conclusive upon a collateral attack."
Furthermore, lands must not only be "known" mineral
lands, but must be known to be more valuable for mining
than for agricultural purposes (Hunt v. Steese, 75 Cal. 620
[17 Pac. 920]), and abandoned dry shafts on the land or the
discovery of mineral in nonpaying quantities will not bring
it within the "known" mineral classification. (Brown v.
Luddy, supra.)
The majority opinion states that "The Act, however, cannot be the source of title to any mineral lands. As Justice
Fields stated in Barden v. No. Pacific R. R. Co., supra, the
Railroad Grant of July 25, 1866, when it excepted mineral
lands meant that title to all mineral lands was to remain in
the United States, and no rights to such lands could in any
way pass to the railroad."
But one conclusion can be drawn from the above-quoted
statement attributed to Justice Field in the Barden case, and
that is, that the writer of the majority opinion did not read
the whole of said decision. The point which is made in the
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Barden case and which the majority opinion seems completely
to have ignored or overlooked is, and I solicit indulgence for
repetition, that land known to contain mineral' in paying
quantities may not be patented under said act to the railroads, but that it is recognized that minerals are often not
discovered at the time of the issuance of patent, or that the
mineral content is not known at that time to be sufficient to
classify the lands as being more valuable for mineral than
for agricultural purposes; nevertheless, that title cannot be
allowed to float around unsettled indefinitely ad infinitum;
that the time of the issuance of patent is the best time to
settle once and for all who shall have title to the land; that
in view of the mineral land exception in the granting act, a
determination as to the .character of land is necessary before
patent thereto can issue; that said determination shall be
conclusive in order to make the title conveyed by said patent
settled and permanent regardless of the fact that minerals
might later be discovered therein.
The majority opinion criticizes the citation by plaintiffs of
Burke v. So. Pacific R. R. 00., supra, West v. Standard Oil
00., supra, and Davis v. Wiebbold, 139 U. S. 507 [11 Sup. Ct.
628, 35 L. Ed. 238], as authority for the statement that a
patent to railroad land is conclusive as to the agricultural
character of the land, stating that these cases concern only
the rights of a mining claimant coming into existence after
the securing of the agricultural patent.
It is true that in Davis v. Wiebbold, supra, the town-site
patent under which defendant claimed the lands in controversy antedated the discovery of minerals therein. The case
of Burke v. So. Pacific R. R. 00., supra, however, did not
involve a subsequent discovery of minerals. In said case certain lands were located as mineral claims in 1892. Subsequent thereto on May 9, 1892, the defendant railroad company with knowledge of said prior claims made application
to have the same land patented to it under the Railroad
Grant Act of July 27, 1866, and the Joint Resolution of 1870.
The railroad company made a false affidavit, no notice of
hearing was given, and a patent was issued on July 10, 1894.
The original mineral claimants failed to perform their assessment work for one year, whereupon the present claimants in
March, 1909, relocated said land as placer mining claims.
The court held that the government had never brought a
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bill in equity to have the patent vacated or annulled, that the
time for so doing had expired, that there was no privity between the plaintiffs and the original mineral claimants, that
the patent could not be successfully attacked by strangers
who had no interest in the land at the time the patent was
issued and were not prejudiced by it. It was further held
that the patent though issued without investigation on the
part of the land officers was conclusive though the land was
afterward ascertained to be mineral.
The case of West v. Standard Oil 00., supra, is authority
for the proposition for which it was cited, but itself involves
a ,different question. The Standard Oil Oompany claimed
certain school lands under patent from the State of Oalifornia. The Act of 1853, granting school lands to the states,
made no provision for del ermining the character of such
lands or for the exclusion from the grant of the land found
to contain mineral; it did not provide for the issuance of
patents; and no patent nor any evidence of title had been
issued to the state. The Standard Oil Oompany contended
that the nonmineral character of the land had been established by a final determination in the department. The
court held that no final determination as to the character of
the land had been made by the department, that no patent
had been issued which would imply that a determination as
to the character of the land had been made, and that, therefore, the Department of the Interim', had not lost its jurisdiction over the land, and the original inquiry ordered by
the Land Department as to the character of the land was
subject to a reopening. The cases above cited all stand for
the proposition that a patent is conclusive as to the character
of the land, but do not all involve situations in which the
mining claim came into existence after the securing of an
agricultural patent.
The majority opinion states that" a patent, however, issued
merely on the basis of an ex parte hearing on behalf of the
claimant to the land can in no way abrogate the existing
vested extralateral rights of parties who had nothing to do
with the proceedings." The facts in the cases cited in support of this proposition are not similar to the case at bar, but
concern conflicts between mining claimants as to the ownership of extralateral veins. They hold that at the issuance
of a patent all surface rights are determined, but that a
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patent does not necessarily determine all underground conflicts as between mineral claimants.
In my opinion the evidence in this case is not sufficient to
prove that the owners of the Pennsylvania and Jefferson
mines had followed their veins extralaterally to a point
where they penetrated the Ames Tract at the time of the
issuance of patent thereto. Assuming for the time being,
however, that such be the case, it seems to me that the fact
that the alleged owners of said veins had knowledge of their
eXIstence and their location, makes out an even stronger case
for the plaintiffs, for they sat idly by and permitted the
. railroad company to secure a patent to said lands as being
. nonmineral, when, if said alleged owners had asserted their
claim to the same, the railroad company would have been
permitted, in fact required,' to select lieu lands in their stead
-lands to which it unquestionably would have obtained a
common law fee title extending to the center of the earthand therefore, defendant should now be estopped to claim
that the character of the land to which it now lays claim
could not be determined in a mere ex parte hearing.
The grants in aid of railroads were not mere gratuities,
they were designed to be compensation for the building of
roads, and the mining claimants here, by their negligence or
indolence let the railroad company take lands which allegedly
included their extralateral veins, then causing them to lose
thei:r right to select lieu lands in their stead.
It is unfortunate, of course, if the mineral claimants lose
a .portion of their mineral vein. But it is unfortunate also
that the agricultural patentee should suffer. In rendering a
decision between the two, it is my opinion that the party
who has the knowledge and means of protecting his own
rights but slept on them, must be the loser, and not the innocent party who acted to the best of his knowledge and in
good faith.
By way of justification for its predecessor's inertia in not
protecting the right to which it now lays claim, defendant
points out that adverse proceedings are permitted only in
case of surface conflicts; and that protest likewise would not
have been recognized because the Land Department has no
jurisdiction to determine underground conflicts in the issuance of patents to public lands.

.
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In the first place, ",dverse proceedings are proper only between rival mining claimants, and, even if that were not
true, had defendant's mining claim been located on the railroad land which was open to location at any time prior to
patent, the lands would have been removed from the grant
and such proceedings would have been unnecessary. Since
notice by publication must be given before patent is issued,
defendant's predecessor had at least constructive knowledge
that such patent was about to issue and counsel for defendant do not negative that fact in their briefs. Having knowledge of the extension of its vein under the plaintiffs' land,
and notice that a nonmineral patent was about to issue
thereon, defendant's predecessor then had two avenues by
which it might have protected its extralateral right. It
might either have entered upon the railroad land and located
a mineral claim thereon prior to patent, or it might have
"protested" the issuance of the patent to the railroad com,pany. That protesting the issuance of patent is a proper
method of securing a determination as to the character of
land is well borne out by the following authorities:
According to Costigan on Mining Law (p. 387), "a protest may be filed at any time prior to the issuance of patent
by any person who alleges a state of facts which should prevent the issuance of a patent. Except in the case of an excluded co-owner, the office of a protest is to show that the
land claimed is not the kind it is represented to be, or that
the applicant has failed to comply with the law in a matter
which would, avoid the claim."
Quoting from Lindley on Mines (3d ed.), at page, 1752, I
find the statement that:
"Often a protestant is a mere volunteer, an amicus curiae,
who calls the attention of the department to an alleged noncompliance with the law on the part of the applicant, which
otherwise might be overlooked, or raises the issues as to the
character of the land, in the ultimate determination of which
issue the protestant mayor may not have an interest proximate or remote;" and on page 1757, in discussing section
2325 of the Revised Statutes [30 U. S. C. A. 29], said authority states:
, 'While controversies over the character of the land are
not subjects of adverse claims under the sections of the Revised Statutes under consid,eration, they are, however, the
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subject of protest in any proceeding where title to public
land is sought to be acquired, and where such issue is raised,
it is the duty of the department to see that the lands are
disposed of according to the law governing the quality of the
lands under consideration."
In the case of German Ins. 00. v. Hayden, 21 Colo. 127
[40 Pac. 453, 52 Am. St. Rep. 206, 210], after quoting section 2325, United States Revised Statutes, to the effect that
no objection to the issuance of a patent shall be heard "except it be shown that the applicant has failed to comply with
the terms of this chapter", the court said:
"The standing of the protestant seems to be regulated by
the exception in the paragraph last quoted. The statement
that he is not a party and therefore not entitled to appeal,
is immaterial to the real question at issue. The law does not
knowingly. permit a claimant to obtain patent under the
mineral laws to agricultural lands, and, when a patent is applied for, it is quite unimportant as to how the attention of
the land department may be called to the character of the
land sought to be patented. That department certainly has
the right to make necessary rules governing the manner in
which the character of the land shall be made to appear both
prima facie and ultimately, and if these rules are not complied with, or if it appears that the land is not such as can
be entered under the particular claim advanced, as for instance, where agricultural lands are applied for under the
mining laws, it is not only the province but the duty of the
land department to deny the entry. It should be unneces~
sary to cite authorities in support of the foregoing, but as
the contrary has been seriously urged in this case, we cite
the following cases: Lindsey v. Hawes, 2 Black, 554 [17
L. Ed. 265] ; Pierce v. Frace, 2 Wash. 81 [26 Pac. 192, 807] ;
Harkness v. Underhill, 1 Black, 316 [17 L. Ed. 208]; McArthy [McOarthy] v. Main [Mann], 19 Wall. 20 [22 L. Ed.
49].) "
If defendant's predecessor had taken advantage of either
of the two methods open to it to preserve its claims, the railroad company would also have been protected, for upon
withdrawal of the Ames land from its grant, the company
would have been entitled to select other lands in lieu of those
withdrawn. But, the mining company, having knowledge of
the existence of the vein which it claimed, made no attempt

~

AMES

v.

EMPIRE S'£AR MINES

Co.,

LTD.

249

to protect its claim. By this neglect it deprived the railroad
company of the lieu lands which it might have selected, and
now asserts that it is the owner of the vein Which underlies
the surface of the railroad company's land. I can reach
but one conclusion from these facts, that the defendant's
predecessor slept on its rights and that defendant now is
estopped to come in and cla,im them to the detriment of the
plaintiffs.
Let us assume an illustration for the purpose of demonstrating a situation which might exist if the position contended for by defendant and adopted by the majority opinion is correct.
" A" locates a mining claim on unpatented land. Shortly
thereafter, "B" files an application for a homestead on a
quarter-section of land adjacent to "A's" mining claim.
" A" proceeds to develop his mining claim and "B" his
homestead. "B" proves up on his homestead and' obtains a
patent thereto from the government. "A" files no contest
or protest against the patenting of the land to "B". Years
after" B" obtains his patent, "A" finds that in following the
vein which apexed on his mining claim, it penetrates "B's"
agricultural land. The extraction of ore from this vein on
"B 's" land, mayor may not interfere with the use and enjoyment of "B 's" land.
Query. As a matter of justice and equity or even public
policy, should "A" be permitted to mine and extract gold
from "B 's" land, which had been conclusively determined
to be nonmineral land at the time patent was issue to "B" Y
Answer. I think not. I believe that a rule more consonant with justice and equity would require" A" to pay" B"
for the privileg·e of mining on "B 's" land if sufficient gold
is found thereon to justify mining operations. The fact
that "A" located his mining claim before "B" filed his
homestead application, should not give" A" the right to follow the dip of a vein apexing on his mining claim into" B 's"
agricultural land. 'rhe situation presented in the case at
bar is substantially the same as that contained in the above
illustration, and I am not persuaded that there are any considerations of equity, justice, or public policy, to justify the
extension of the extralateral right doctrine so as to permit
the owner of a vein apexing on a mining claim to follow the
same on its dip into land conclusively determined to be non-
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mineral land even though such determination is made after
the discovery and location of the mining claim on which said
vein apexes.
The doctrine of extralateral rights is well recognized between mines and mining proprietors. As between them, I do
not mean to disturb long established rules. On the other
hand, such extralateral right is pur(,\ly statutory. The common law would give to each claimant all ore bodies beneath
the surface of his tract. It is a special privilege or exceptional right which is conferred by statute as an incidental of
a valid lode location. It is my view that such special right
should be confined and limited to the field in which it was
intended to operate and in which it creates no injustice because of its reciprocal character.
As to mining proprietors, each takes his property anticipating that veins apexing thereon may extend extralaterally
into the land of others, and that the veins of others may in
like manner pierce his boundaries. But the agricultural
patentee expects to acquire a common law fee in his land
conferring complete ownership therein to the center of the
earth. Therefore, those who claim extralateral rights in
public lands which are being patented as nonmineral lands
.:.;:
owe a duty to inform the General Land Office of said claim.
I do not mean to say here that owners of mining claims
are put on notice to protect their extralateral vein from every.
one who seeks to patent the land which overlies them. As
to mining patentees, that is, of course, unnecessary. However, the means of ascertaining the extent and direction of
his mineral veins, if not the actual knowledge, is within the
power of the mineral claimant. It, is upon him therefore
that there devolves the duty of giving notice to the General
Land Office about to issue a patent conveying a common law
fee to the land overlying said veins that he claims a mineral
right therein and that a nonmineral patent thereto should not
issue, unless, of course, by some specific agreement the extralateral rights therein are to be excepted or reserved.
In view of the fact that most grants of public lands except mineral lands, and mineral rights therein may be protected by the methods hereinabove men,tioned, no great hardship is inflicted upon mining claimants by requiring them to
notify the Land Office of their claims and thus prevent unin-
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tcntional error on the part of the government officials, and
hardship to innocent purchasers of agricultural lands.
The majority opinion states: "The subsurface of the Ames
tract being clearly mineral could not pass under the terms
of the Act but remained in the Government, and the Pennsylvania and Jefferson mines received full extralateral rights to
mine therein by virtue of the Mining Act of July 26, 1866."
The majority opinion further states: "It is well established
that the government cannot convey away land which it no
longer owns and that a patent cannot cut off previously existing vested rights in the patented property." It is obvious
that the last statement quoted above is in direct conflict with
the first quoted statement; that is, in the first statement
above quoted, the majority opinion states that the title to
the mineral bearing subsurface of the Ames Tract remained
in the g'overnment at the time it conveyed the Ames Tract
to the railroad company, and in the last statement quoted
above the majority opinion states that such mineral bearing
subsurface had already vested in the owner of the mining
claims.
The case of Reynolds v. Iron Silver Mining 00., 116 U. S.
687 [6 Sup. Ct. 601, 29 L. Ed. 774], cited by the majority
opinion as authority for the last statement quoted above, is
not helpful because the court therein decided under a statute
which provided that where a vein or lode was known to exist
within the boundaries of a placer claim, application for
patent which did not include application for the vein or lode
should be construed as a declaration that the claimant had no
right of possession of the vein or lode claim, that the jury
already had determined that the patentees of the placer claim
knew at the time of application for patent of the existence
of the lode and did not claim the lode in said application and
therefore were precluded from subsequently exerting title
thereto.
The fundamental error in the majority opinion is that it
in effect holds that the government reserved the mineral
in the Ames Tract when it conveyed the same to the railroad
company. This holding is contrary to all of the decisions
rendered by the Supreme Oourt of the United States in
the past eighty years and to all of the decisions of this
court with the exception of the cases of Van Ness v. Rooney,
supraJ Brown v. Luddy, supra~ and Ohicago Quartz Mining
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00. v. Oliver, supra, which, as pointed out hereinabove, were
decided upon a theory which has been disapproved by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
If both tracts of land had been mineral, it is elementary
that each would have had the right to follow into the lands
of the other, the extralateral dip of veins which apexed
within their respective boundaries, and this without regard
to the priority of the patents. But the reciprocal right to
so follow mineral veins extralaterally is characteristic of
mineral lands only.
That mineral veins extending extralaterally may' not be
followed into landiil conveyed by prior agricultural patents
has already been determined. The Supreme Court of Oregon in Reeves v. Oregon Exploration 00., 127 Or. 686 [273
Pac. 389, 391], commented on the right to follow an extralateral vein into agricultural lands previously patented under the Timber and Stone Act of June 3, 1878, in the following manner:
"We find no merit in the contention that defendant has
the same right to follow its vein under the surface of plaintiffs' land that it would have had if plaintiffs' land had
been acquired under the mining laws. The right of a junior
lode claimant, whether his claim be patented or unpatented,
to follow the dip of his vein into an adjoining patented or
unpatented lode claim, is one which arises under the mining laws, and is confined to titles acquired under the mining
laws, and has no application to a case where the vein of a
lode claim on its dip extends into lands the title to which
has been acquired under agricultural patents. Between lode
claimants the right of one to pursue his vein on its dip
under the surface of the other is recognized by the courts.
Sec Lindley on Mines (3d ed.), sec. 611, and authorities cited.
But such right is not recognized by the courts as between
a . lode claimant and an agricultural claimant, whose title
was acquired under a grant made prior to the location of
the lode claim. We think that this particular question is
settled by the decision of Judge Sawyer in Amador-Medean
Gold Min. 00. v. South Spring Hill Gold M'in. 00. (C. C.),
36 Fed. [668], 669, 13 Sawy. 523. The doctrine announced
in that case has been recognized as the law for more than
50 years and we have been cited to no case holding to a
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contrary doctrine." (See, also, Anaconda Oopper Mining
00. v. Pilot-Butte Min. 00., 52 Mont. 165 [156 Pac. 409].)
To my mind, the whole fallacy of the majority opinion
lies in the fact that it ignores the sanctity of a patent and
the security which the obtaining of a patent is supposed
to give a patentee.
I believe, there is nothing more important in our economic
system than the certainty of the title under which real
property in private ownership is held. Rules applicable
to the determination of such titles should be so entrenched
in our legal and economic systems that they should not be
subject to change or variation or rendered uncertain by
judicial decision of this or any other court. When a person
receives a conveyance of land predicated upon a patent issued by the government of the United States containing no
reservations or restrictions, he should be able to rest secure
in the belief that he is the owner of such land and that his
right to exercise all of the incidents of ownership, occupation,
possession and use thereof cannot be challenged by anyone
not in privity with his legal or equitable title. If the majority
opinion in this case is permitted to stand, it will remove from
the arch of title structure the keystone which renders that
structure safe and secure.
It has long been the policy of the courts of this state and
of the Supreme Court of the United States to recognize the
sacred title of a patentee. The Supreme Court of this state
has many times reiterated its policy to regard as final and
certain a title acquired ey patent. (See Saunders v. La
Purisima etc. 00., 125 Cal. 159 [57 Pac. 656].) And in Gale
v. Best, 78 Cal. 235, at 239 [20 Pac. 550, 12 Am. St. Rep.
44], this court quoted with favor the words of Justice Field,
in the case of Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. 00., 106
U. S. 447 [1 Sup. Ct. 389, 27 L. Ed. 226] :
"In Steel v. Smelting 00., supra, Justice Field, whose exhaustive opinion we cannot here undertake to reproduce,
among other things, says as follows:
" 'We have so often had occasion to speak of the Land
Department, the object of its creation, and the p~wers it possesses in the alienation by patent of portions of the public
lands, that it creates an unpleasant surprise to find that
counsel, in discussing the effect to be given to the action
of that department, overlook our decisions on the subject.
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That department, as we have repeatedly said, was established to supervise the various proceedings whereby a conveyanceof the title from the United States to portions of
the public domain is obtained, and to see that the requirements
of different acts of Congress are fully complied with. Necessarily, therefore, it must consider and pass upon the qualifications of the applicant, the acts he has performed to secure the
title, the nature of the land, and whether it is of the class
which is open to sale. Its judgment upon these matters is
that of a special tribunal, and is unassailable except by direct
proceedings for its annulment or limitation. Such has been
the uniform language of this court in repeated decisions.'
And again, speaki'ng of the lands held by the possessor of a
patent, he says: 'If intruders upon them could compel him,
in every suit for possession, to establish the validity of the
action of the Land Department and the correctness of its
rulings upon matters submitted to it, the patent, instead 0/
being a means of peace and security, would subject his rights
to constant and ruinous litigation. He would recover one
portion of his land if the jury were satisfied that the evidence
produced justified the action of that department, and lose
another portion, the title whereto rests upon the same facts,
because another jury came to a different conclusion. So his
rights in different suits upon the same patent would be determined, not by its efficacy as a conveyance of the government,
but accordipg to the fluctuating prejudices of different jurymen, or their varying capacities to weigh evidences.' (104
U. ·S. 636, 641.) And the pith of the whole matter is aptly
expressed by the same learned justice in Smelting 00. v.
Kemp, 104U. S. 636 [26 L. Ed. 875], where, speaking of the
land department, he says: 'Indeed, the doctrine as to the
:regularity and validity of its acts, where it has jurisdiction,
goes so far that if ~ any circumstances under existing law
a patent would be held valid, it will be presumed that such circumstances existed.' "
.If the 'rule that patents to railroad lands are conclusive as
to their nonmineral character were otherwise, to quote from
Judge Farrington's decision in Southern Development 00. v.
Endersen, 200 Fed. 272, 275:
"A title which today is valuable because the land is apparently non-mineral tomorrow may become utterly void and
worthless by reason of the discovery of mineral. Methods of
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extraction and reduction may be devised of such cheapness
and efficiency as to render mining highly profitable on lands
which at the date of selection and listing, had and could have
had no vaille for mineral purposes. The courts have never
yielded to the argument that Congress intended to provide
for titles so elusive."
Therefore the answer to the statement in the majority opinion that title to the vein underlying the Ames Tract had
passed out of the hands of the government into the hands of
mining locators is that that question was determined adversely
to said locators by the issuance of the patent to the railroad
company. If we do not take this view we place the patentee
of land in the situation so' roundly condemned by Justice
Field in the case of Steel v. Smelting 00., supra, where "his
rights ... upon the same patent would be determined, not
by its efficacy as a conveyance of the government, but according to the fluctuating prejudices of different jurymen,"
i ;j
,,:1
1,
"

.
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That the patent so issued determined the mining locators'
claiIns adversely to them is supported by the case of Thomas
v. Horst, 54 Mont. 260 [169 Pac. 731], wherein a patent was
issued to a railroad company subsequent to the location of
quartz mining claims upon the same land. Instead of determining the character of each parcel of land at the time of
patent, the character of all lands granted to the railroad company therein were classified by a commission under authority
of an act of Congress, and notice of such classification was
published prior to the issuance of patent. If no protest was
filed, the classification was declared to be final except for
fraud. This classification was held to have the same legal
effect as a determination at the time of patent such as that
held in Barden v. No. Pacific R. R. 00., supra, to be conclusive.

ii
L:

I

!

The court then said, "If lots 1 and 2 outside the limits of
the Homestake claim were classified as nonmineral, and no
protest was filed, or if protest was filed and, after hearing,
was overruled, such classification, in the absence of fraud,
became final, and settled for all time that the land was in
fs-::t nonmineral in character. . . .
"If we indulge the presumption declared by the Supreme
Court that the issuance of patent is in the nature of a judicial
determination, that every fact has been found which is neces-

1,;
"

!

i

I~

'1

i

256

AMES

11.

EMPIRE STAR MINES CO., LTD.

[17 C. (2d)

sary to entitle the patentee to the legal title to the land, the
conclusion appears inevitable that the allegation in this complaint that patent issued to the Northern Pacific is tantamount
to an allegation that the land in controversy was duly classified as nonmineral, and the classification approved before tbl::
mineral claims were located and since the determination of
the mineral or nonmineral character of the land presented a
question of fact for decision by the land department, its judgment thereon is conclusive upon the courts in the absence of
fraud.
"Of course, if the mIneral or nonmineral character of this
land was open to investigation notwithstanding its classification, then the allegation in the complaint that it was and is
mineral land is sufficient to show that the land department
was without jurisdiction to convey it to the railway company;
but, as we have observed before, if the classification did not
finally determine the character of this land, the utmost that
can be said of it is that it was an idle ceremony, and the
act of February 26, 1895, was a meaningless piece of legislation. "
In conclusion, I desire to summarize the principles of law,
which in my opinion are applicable to the case at bar, and
which, when applied to the facts of this case must result in a
reversal of the judgment of the trial court in so far as it grants
to the Pennsylvania mining claim extralateral rights in the
Ames Tract.
The Railroad Grant Act of July 25, 1866, created a present
grant of nonmineral land to the railroad company; that is,
the grant took effect as of that date, if and when the railroad
company complied with the provisions of the act with reference to the location and construction of a railroad and filed
its map of location with the General Land Office. The grant
of such land remained a float until the filing of such map,
and title thereupon vested in the railroad company subject to
the. determination by the General Land Office as to whether
or not said land was mineral or nonmineral in character.
If the Land Office determined that any of the land covered
by the grant was mineral in character, the same was excluded
from the grant, and the railroad company was given other
nonmineral land in lieu of the mineral land so excluded. If
the Land Office determined that the land covered by the grant
was nonmineral, and a patent was issued to the railroad com-
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pany, the issuance of such patent conclusively determined the
nonmineral character of the land, and the railroad company
got a common law fee in the land granted, including all
mineral deposited therein. Unless discovery of mineral in
paying quantities was called to the attention of the government officials before patent was issued to the railroad company, all claims to the mineral in such land was cut off by
the issuance of such patent. The provision in a patent issued
to a railroad company excepting mineral or mineral land from
the grant was and is void, and the railroad company was
granted a common law fee including all mineral deposits in
the land upon the issuance of the patent.
A valid mineral location gives to the locator the right to
follow extralaterally on their dip downward all veins apexing
on his claim which penetrate other mineral lands, but extralateral rights do not exist in agricultural or nonminerallands.
When the Land Office determined that the Ames Tract was
nonmineral in character and the government issued a patent
thereto to the railroad company, the latter was granted a common law fee in said land which related back to the date of
the passage of the Railroad Grant Act of July 25, 1866, and
cut qff all intervening rights of those asserting that said land
was more valuable for mineral than nonmineral purposes.
The defendant therefore is barred from asserting the right
to extract mineral from the Ames Tract upon the theory that
it may do so under the extralateral right doctrine.
Defendant admits that the Jefferson title is not as "clear
cut" as that to the Pennsylvania, but argues that once said
title was in existence, it will be presumed to continue so until
the contrary is proved. Although the Jefferson claim was
relocated in 1891, and subsequently disputed by various claimants, defendant states that it has acquired by various options
and deeds or leases the rights of those rival claimants. In further defense of its right to mine on the Jefferson vein, defendant offers the "Ebert reservation", of'which it is the assignee.
I find it unnecessary to give further consideration to the
contentions of either party so far as the Jefferson claim is
concerned, for the reason that the conclusion which I have
reached as to defendant's right to follow extralaterally the
dip of the vein apexing on the Pennsylvania claim is equally
applicab~e to that of the J ef!erson claim.
17 c. (2d)-1I
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The right of the defendant to follow the Jefferson vein
on· its dip under the A.mes land is finally determined, however, upon a reservation in the deed from Ebert to A.mes
hereinabove referred to as the" Ebert reservation; '. Under
this reservation, Ebert reserved to himself, his successors and
assigns, "the right to follow the Jefferson gold quartz ledge
with its dip, and to mine and extract the ore from the same
. in and upon said (the Ames) land, without disturbing the sur,face of said land". I am of the opinion that by this reservation, Ebert retained the right to follow the Jefferson vein
. under the surface of the Ames land, and that this right was
transferable.
By mesne conveyances, defendant succeeded to the rights of
..Ebert, .und,er this reservation. Although it cannot be said
'that defendant did thereby acquire an estate in' the lands of
the plaintiffs, it did obtain the right to remove the ore fro~
said vein and title to the ore so mined. Since a right carries
with it. the incidents necessary to its exercise, defendant has
'a right of entry which constitutes a complete and ample de}ense to this action.
Whether or not such right is exclusive is a matter of interpretation depending in part on the intention of the parties
and the surrounding circumstances at the time of the grant.
For, the present, in the absence of evidence, I deem it neither
necessary nor proper to reach a determination on that point.
In view of the conclusion which I have reached in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the trial court should be
reversed.
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In the Matter of the Estate of PHILIP RICHARDS, Deceased. FRANK BENNALLACK, as Administrator,
etc., Appellant, v. E. M. RECTOR, as Administrator
With Will Annexed, etc., Respondent.
[lJ Decedents' Estates-Executors and Administrators-Powers,
Duties and Liabilities-Compromise-Compromise of Claims
Against Estate-Application of Statute to Accounting;-Section 578 of the Probate Code, authorizing the compromise of
claims upon the approval of a petition therefor does not apply
to the settlement of accouni;s of a personal representative.
Until the entry of an order settling the account, there can be
no determination of the amount due fNm the representative,
and until that time there can be no basis for a petition or
order of compromise.

[2J Appeal and Error-Judgments and Orders Appealable-Orders Relating to Judgment-Order Refusing to Vacate Judgment or Order.-After the elapsing of the time within which
to appeal from a judgment or order, an appeal frQnl a subsequent order refusing to set it aside is unavailing.
[3J Decedents' Estates-Executors and Administrators-Compen_
sation-Extra Compensation-Services Compensated.-It cannot be said (assuming the question open for consideration)
that an allowance to a personal representative of $100 a year
for extraordinary services rendered during a period of 47
years is unreasonable, where they consisted of innumerable
services in managing and selling several pieces of real property, paying of many legacies, and delivering of bequests, and
engaging in litigation.
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A petition for a rehearing was denied February 27, 1941.
Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.

[4J Id.-Accounting and Settlement-Settlement-Conclusiveness
""':'Collateral Attack-Want of Attorney's Authority to Stipulate.-The want of authority of an attorney to enter into a
stipulation relative to the settlement of a personal representative's account does not render void the order of settlement,
which is valid on its face, since the authority to settle accounts is vested in the court free of control by the parties.
Especially is this true as to a complaint of want of authority
to stipulate for less than the sum on hand, where it appears
2.

See 2 Cal. Jur. 164.
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McK. Dig. References: 1. Decedents' Estates, § 195; 2. Appeal
and Error, § 60; 3. Decedents' Estates, § 226; 4. Decedents' Estates, § 911; 5. Decedents' Estates, § 1118.
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